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Abstract : The purpose of this paper is to seek a breakthrough for the Korea-EU FTA negotiation in 
agriculture which started last year, but has not made much progress yet. The EU has been asking 
Korea to open its agricultural market to the same extent that was agreed upon in Korea’s free trade 
agreement with the U.S. while the Korean government firmly opposes the EU’s request, saying that 
FTA negotiations differ from multilateral trade talks as in the WTO. An examination of agricultural 
trade among Korea, the EU, and the U.S. shows that there may be many niche markets of which the 
EU can take advantage over other agricultural exporting countries including the U.S. Also, it is 
expected that the EU could gain much from its agricultural trade with Korea through an FTA, even 
without a market access level equal to one stipulated in the Korea-U.S. FTA accord. As far as 
agriculture is concerned, the slower does the talk proceed, the better to Korea, with the EU losing 
huge expected trade gains. It is suggested that the EU needs to be more flexible in the talks by 
focusing on a new strategy that can maximize trade diversion effects stemming not only from price 
but from non-price factors, rather than simply asking for the same level of market opening as in 
Korea-U.S. FTA. This would be the better way for the EU to become a winner in the battle for Korean 
agricultural market. 
 






   The negotiations for the Korea-EU free trade agreement started last year, but they have not made 
much progress yet although it is widely believed that the economic gains as a whole from the accord 
will be substantial for both sides. Agriculture lies at the center of the lingering talks as it holds the key 
to striking the deal.   
The EU has been asking Korea to open its agricultural market to the same extent that was agreed 
upon in Korea’s free trade agreement with the U.S. In order words, the EU claims that the Korea-U.S. 
FTA (hereinafter KORUS) should serve as a guideline in determining the level of agricultural market 
access in the Korea-EU FTA. The Korean government, however, firmly opposes the EU’s request, 
saying that FTA negotiations differ from multilateral trade talks as in the WTO (world trade 
organization), and that the Korea-EU FTA must proceed on an individual basis, independently of the 
result of KORUS. The big gap between the two sides’ stances over the EU’s access to Korean 
agricultural market does not seem to be easily narrowed unless each side’s current positions are 
changed.  
   The purpose of this paper (poster) is, therefore, to seek a breakthrough for the Korea-EU FTA 
negotiations in agriculture by providing new directions to resolve the controversy described above. 
First, we will briefly look at the Korea’s overall tariff structure for agricultural products, followed by 
the KORUS results. Then, the agricultural trade among Korea, the EU, and the U.S. will be examined. 
Finally, an attempt will be made to seek new strategies to break the deadlock, and successfully reach 




II. KOREA’S TARIFF STRUCTURE FOR AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS 
 
      It is well known that Korea is one of the world’s most protective countries in agriculture, with the 
average tariff rate for agricultural products being as high as 60%. According to the H.S. 10 digit 
classification, the share of agricultural products with extremely high tariff rates of over 500% 
accounts for 3.2 percent as shown in table 1. Sesame, ginseng, and barley for beer are those items 
falling into this category. The number of agricultural products with tariff rates higher than 100% 
reaches 126, or 8.8% of the total.   
But most agricultural products, say 77.1%, come into the categories with their tariff rates of less 
than 50%. The tariff rates for most fruit and vegetables, and beef range from 40% to 50% something. 
Dairy products are included in the category with 30-39% tariff rates, chicken and pork 20-29%, and 
grains less than 20%, respectively.   
 
[Table 1] Korea’s Import Tariffs for Agricultural Products 
Import Tariff 
Rates (%) 
Number of Items   
(H.S. 10 digits)  Major Products 
Over 500  46 (3.2 %)  Sesame, Ginseng, Barley for Beer 
200 – 499  62 (4.3 %)  Soybean, Potato, Sweet Potato, Garlic, Pepper,   
100 – 199  18 (1.3 %)  Milk Powder, Citrus, Barley Powder, Onion 
50 – 99  189 (13.0 %)  Orange, Fruit Mixed Juice 
40 – 49  132 (9.1 %)  Fruits, Beef, Mushroom, Watermelon, Cucumber, Carrot
30 – 39  147 (10.1 %)    Cheese, Milk Products, Fruit Beverage 
20 – 29  249 (17.1 %)  Chicken, Pork, Frozen Vegetables 
10 – 19  381 (26.2 %)  Grain Products, Water 
0 – 9.9  212 (14.6 %)  Wheat, Seeds 




III. RESULTS OF KOREA-U.S. FTA NEGOTIATIONS 
 
   According to the Korea’s tariff elimination schedule for agricultural products agreed upon in the 
KORUS, the import tariffs for 578 (37.9%) items out of 1,531 are to be eliminated at the time of the 
agreement taking effect. These include grape juice, wine, flowers, and wheat. This figure accounts for 
55.8 percent of total import value. 86.6 percent of total agricultural products will completely lose their 
protective border measure of tariff within ten years after the accord comes into effect. The agricultural 
products for which import tariffs are to be cut down to zero within eleven to fifteen years account for 
8.7 percent, including beef, chicken, egg, and some fruit and vegetables. Some products such as apple 
(Fuji), pear, and sugar have much longer grace periods in tariff elimination for up to 20 years, 
considering their importance in Korea’s agriculture. 
For some agricultural products, it has been agreed upon to use other measures like seasonal 
variable rates and TRQ (tariff rate quota) along with tariff elimination to open their import markets. 
Cheese, butter, and barley are those examples to which the TRQ rule will be applied along with tariff 
elimination for 10-18 years as well. There is one exception to market opening with the U.S., i.e. rice, 





IV. AGRICULTURAL TRADE AMONG KOREA, EU, AND US 
 
The EU is increasingly becoming an important partner for Korea in agricultural trade, especially 
in import. In 2006, for example, Korea imported a total of 13.3 billion dollars worth of agricultural 
products, of which 1.4 billion dollars (10.9%) flowed in from the EU, whereas agricultural export to 
the EU was only 46 million dollars that amounted to 2.0% of the total agricultural exports of 2,304 
million dollars. Table 2 indicates that Korea’s agricultural import from EU has significantly increased 
for the past four years, with export remaining unchanged or even decreasing. As a result, Korea’s 
trade deficit against EU in agricultural sector reached over 1.4 billion dollars in 2006. The deficit is 
predicted to continue to widen considering the recent export and import trends as shown in table 2. 
 
[Table 2] Korea’s Agricultural Trade with EU (thousand US$) 
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Export  35,440 44,202 51,150 51,642 46,194 
Import  1,032,091 947,513 1,121,927  1,351,985  1,454,472 
Trade  Surplus -996,651  -903,311  -1,070,777 -1,300,343 -1,408,278 
Source: Korea Rural Economic Institute, World Agriculture News, No. 87, 2007. 
 
 
Table 3 shows the agricultural import values from the EU by product, and compares them with 
those from the U.S. Korea imports more pork, milk powder, barley, starch, wine and whiskey from 
EU than from the U.S. The beef and chicken trade was directly affected by the occurrences of 
livestock diseases and showed a sharp fluctuation in trade volume each year.   
 
 
[Table 3] Korea’s Agricultural Imports from EU and U.S. (2005 – 2007 average) 
Items 
Import Value ( thousands US$ )  Unit Import Prices ($/ton) 
EU U.S.  World  EU  U.S. 
Beef  157 (0.02)  32,684 (3.7)  883,724  2,661  6,590 
Pork  373,755 (48.7)  184,986 (24.1)  767,229  2,697  2,293 
Chicken  19,606 (16.8)  30,475 (26.1)  116,972  1,921  1,128 
Cheese 23,518  (15.1)  27,552  (17.6) 156,275  5,418  3,979 
Skim milk 
Powder  2,684 (17.0)  179 (1.1)  15,758  3,092  4,475 
Mixed Powder  50,253 (50.4)  4,142 (4.2)  99,663  2,766  2,919 
Soybean  0 (0.0)  186,994 (48. 3)  387,130  -  308 
Barley  2,650 (4.3)  2,075 (3.4)  62,012  434  537 
Potato  1,089 (2.3)  33,574 (70.1)  47,926  1,360  888 
Corn (food)  2,576 (0.8)  51,475 (15.4)  333,464  393  188 
Corn (feed)  278 (0.03)  663,095 (59.9)  1,107,800 167  172 
Grape  8,509 (12.9)  21,352 (32.3)  66,037  1,287  1,810 
Orange  1,430 (0.8)  124,196 (73.1)  169,924  1,172  1,131 
Starch  20,952 (38.0)  125 (0.2)  55,128  659  3,289 
Wine  59,791 (58.5)  12,903 (12.6)  102,209  4,684  3,068 
Whiskey  237,779 (98.4)  3,212 (1.3)  241,735  11,466  5,082 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are the import shares of world total (%). Unit import prices have been 
calculated by dividing imported value by quantity imported for each product, indicating average 




V. SUGGESTIONS FOR SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF THE TALKS 
 
The EU’s strategy needs to be changed to push the talk toward a successful conclusion, which will 
bring them significant agricultural trade gains. First of all, the EU might want to look at trade 
diversion effect between the EU and other exporting countries including the U.S. The EU needs to 
search for niche markets where they are more competitive than the U.S. They will be able to increase 
agricultural export to Korea without much expansion of Korea’s total import by taking advantage of 
the trade diversion effect so that they can maximize the gains from FTA with Korea.   
Table 3 shows that the EU may have many products that are more cost efficient compared to the 
U.S., such as skim milk powder, grape, starch, etc. The starch from the EU, for example, is much 
cheaper than the US’s, implying that the EU starch even with smaller tariff cut could have more price 
competitiveness in Korean market compared to the US’s.   
Trade diversion effect can also occur from non-price factors such as quality variety, brand loyalty, 
geographical character, etc. The import values for pork, wine, and whisky from the EU are much more 
than those from the U.S., while their unit import prices are much higher than those from the U.S. as in 
table 3. In particular, the average price for whisky imported from the EU more than doubles the price 
from the U.S., whereas its import value from the EU accounts for 98.4 percent of the total. This 
implies that non-price factors are very important in determining the import flows of agricultural 
products into Korean market. There may be many agricultural products, such as pork, wine, and 
whisky, in which the EU has strong competitiveness in non-price factors against the U.S. in Korean 
market. Import tariffs on these items are 25%, 15%, 20%, respectively. The effect of tariff cut on these 
products might not be so substantial. 
Another important point to be noted is that there may be many products for which the combined 
shares of the EU and the U.S. are very small compared to the world total, including barley, corn 
(food), and beef as in table 3. By concluding the Korea-EU FTA, the EU could gain much in these 
markets. In such markets, the EU could increase export to Korea without keenly competing with the 
U.S.  
To what extent the tariff for agricultural products should be cut needs to be judged on an 
individual product basis considering not only price-related factors but also various non-price aspects 
discussed above. The EU should not stick to price aspect alone by requesting the same market 
opening as in KORUS. Korean government’s counter argument that an FTA deal differs from 
multilateral trade talks does not seem to be unreasonable. Rather, the better strategy for EU is to 
conclude the FTA with Korea as quickly as possible even though the level of tariff cut is not the same 
as that of KORUS. Once the deal is signed and implemented, the EU will definitely gain in 





The Korea-EU FTA is expected to have significant adverse impacts on Korean agriculture, 
assuming that the EU’s request will be realized. This is why many people in Korea believe that the 
FTA talks underway may fail if Korean farmers face the same market opening as in KORUS for all 
agricultural products. Under this circumstance, it is highly unlikely that Korean government accepts 
the EU’s request at the risk of being criticized by local farmers and the public as well. 
The EU could definitely gain from its agricultural trade with Korea through an FTA, even without 
a market access equal to one stipulated in KORUS. There may be many niche markets of which the 
EU can take advantage over other agricultural exporting countries including the U.S. As far as 
agriculture is concerned, the slower does the talk proceed, the better to Korea, with the EU losing 
huge expected trade gains. 5 
 
   The EU needs to show more flexibility in the talks to increase agricultural exports to the Korean 
market. They should focus on a new strategy that can maximize trade diversion effects stemming not 
only from price but from non-price factors, rather than simply ask for the same level of market 
opening seen in KORUS. This would be the better way for the EU to become a big winner not a loser 
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